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DISCLAIMER 
This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States 
Government. Neither the United Stales Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their 
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability ur rcsponsi-
hihly for Ihe accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or 
process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Refer-
ence herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, 
manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recom­
mendation, or favoring by the United Slates Government or any agency thereof. The views 
and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those or the 
United States Government or any agency thereof. 
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Thermal damage to susceptible material in accessible 
regions of the reactor building was distributed in non­
uniform patterns. No clear explanation for non-
uniformity was found in examined evidence, e.g., burned 
materials were adjacent to materials that appear 
similar but were not burned. Because these items were 
in proximity to vertical openings that extend the 
height of the reactor building, we assume the unburned 
materials preferentially absorbed water vapor during 
--periods of high, local steam concentration. Simple 
hydrogen-fire-exposure tests and heat transfer calcula­
tions duplicate the degree of damage found on inspected 
materials from the containment building. These data 
support estimated 8% pre-fire hydrogen concentration 
predictions based on various hydrogen production 
mechanisms. 
About 10 hours after the 28 March 1979 loss-of-coolant accident 
began at the Three Mile Island Dnit 2 Reactor Building, a hydrogen 
deflagration of undetermined extent occurred inside the reactor 
building. Hydrogen was generated as a result of reaction between 
zirconium nuclear fuel rod cladding and steam produced as the 
reactor core was uncovered. Figures 1 through 4 are extracted from 
a variety of resources (indicated on figure), and they summarize 
*This work was performed under the auspices of the U. S. Dept. of 
Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under contract No. 
W-7405-ENG-48. Sections of this paper were originally published in 
GEND-INF-023, Vol. VI, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, D.C. (1983) under DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-76IDO1570. 
**I borrowed figures and paraphrased text from others (1, 3, 4) 
who devoted extensive time to analyze the hydrogen burn at Till-2 
reactor building. I acknowledge them throughout this paper, and I 
hope my interpretation of their analyses is correct. 
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the conditions and evidence of hydrogen release. Figure 1 is a 
schematic of the reactor coolant system showing the path of 
hydrogen release. Measurements of background activity increase 
(Figure 2) show the release occurred about 2.5 hours past turbine 
trip. Henrie and Postma (3) as well as Zalosh and others (Vj 
estimate hydrogen accumulation in the core by a variety of means 
(Figure 3): 
o Timing of projected hydrogen generation in the core; 
o Timing the pressure relief valve opening periods; 
o Pressure changes in the reactor coolant system; 
o Calculations of hydrogen mass burned; and, 
o Measurements of post-burn hydrogen concentration. 
Figure 4 shows the reactor-building pressure record starting from 
the time of reactor trip to well after the combustion produced 
pressure pulse. 
Interviews with "on duty" plant personnel indicate they did 
not perceive that the "thud" they heard was caused by a hydrogen 
deflagration in the reactor building. Moreover, paucity of easily 
observable damage delayed recognition that a hydrogen burn did 
occur for about two days. Ignition of the hydrogen-and-air mixture 
release after the breach of the reactor coolant drain-tank (RCDT) 
rupture disk resulted in nominal thermal and overpressure damage to 
susceptible materials in all accessible regions of TMI-2. 
Initiation of burn and subsequent termination of induced fires are 
indicated by data from a variety of pressure and temperature 
sensors located throughout the containment volume. 
Activation of the building spray system is defined by 
inflection and increase in the negative slope of interior-pressure-
reduction curves (Figure 5). Also indicated is a pressure increase 
of about 28 psig achieved in a period of about 12 s.(_3) 
Experimental confirmation of the pressure response of hydrogen 
combustion in constant volume chambers is indicated in Figure 6. 
Note that the act of causing turbulent conditions in the test 
chamber causes greater pressure rise at lower hydrogen 
concentration. 
The hydrogen-in-air concentration [H2] was estimated to be 
approximately 6 to 8%. At this concentration range, propagation of 
flame is possible upward and horizontally in quiescent conditions, 
but not downward. Figure 7 shows how laminar burning velocity 
varies with hydrogen concentration in air. Directed arrows at the 
lean and rich regions of hydrogen concentration indicate allowed 
flame-spread propagation vectors. This effect occurs because of 
competition between fundamental flame speed and buoyancy induced by 
reactants temperature rise. Figure 8 shows an example of lean limit 
propagation for methane-air-nitrogen mixtures. This illustrates 
the effect expected in hydrogen concentrations less than 8% in air. 
However, turbulent conditions, established circulation patterns, 
and the ambient absolute humidity of the mixture can perturb propa­
gation patterns in ways that are only qualitatively understood.(4-5) 
Assuming uniform mixing of 8% hydrogen-in-air concentration and 
induction of adequate turbulence in internal circulation flows, 
average flame speeds of 5 m/s (16 ft/s) are possible — even in the 
presence of saturated steam environments.(6) 
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A cross section of the reactor building (Figure 9) and plan 
view of the main (347-ft) operations level (Figure 10) show the 
regions of thermal and burn damage. Given that few operational 
ignition sources were available in the reactor building above the 
305-ft level, the time delay to achieve peak overpressure is consis­
tent with an ignition location in the basement. Potential electri­
cal shorting of electrical control systems caused by basement water 
spillage and the frequency of steam and hydrogen release from the 
reactor coolant drain-tank pressure-release system supports this 
assumption. 
Thermal damage to fine fuels (fine fuel is defined as a 
flammable material with high surface-to-volume ratio) indicates 
general exposure of all susceptible interior surfaces to fire with 
the exception of random materials including fabric ties of unknown 
composition, 2 x 4 framing lumber on both the 305-ft and 347-ft 
levels, and various polymeric materials. These unburned items are 
evident in photographic and video surveys, and were visually 
reconfirmed by various entry participants. This pattern is 
reported in several preliminary reports.(7-3) Possible mechanisms 
to prevent thermal damage to these items include: 
o Preferential absorption of water from saturated 
atmosphere, requiring greater thermal exposure to 
produce thermal damage. 
o Direct exposure to high-concentration steam and water 
vapor, requiring greater thermal exposure to produce 
-— thermal damage. 
o Shielding from thermal radiation by position or geometric 
obscuration. 
o Shielding from the expanding flame front or convectively 
driven hot gases by physical obstruction. 
Although photographic surveys of internal reactor building 
vistas, ensembles, items, and surfaces were abundant (approx 600 
photos from 29 entries), clarity of the burn detail in most 
photographs was not adequate for diagnostic purposes. However, the 
extent of thermal damage was defined (Figures 9 and 10) as regions 
where thermally degraded materials were located, photographed, and, 
in some cases, extracted from the reactor building for further 
examination. 
Ignition of a uniformly distributed near-lower-limit mi.xture 
of hydrogen in air, spreading from basement ignition sources to the 
top of the reactor building dome by turbulent propagation modes, 
occurred in the time period indicated in Figure 5. The flame front 
would have been at an adiabatic flame temperature of about 700°c to 
800°C (approximately 1000°K), as shown in Figure 11. 
Exact paths of flame propagation are undefined. Because of 
the low hydrogen concentration, preferential flame spread was 
upward in quiescent atmosphere; however, air motion produced by 
reactor building coolers, steam/hydrogen release from the rupture 
disk line of the RCDT and flow distortion around obstructions 
caused turbulent flow conditions which greatly modify flame spread 
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rates. The source of major hydrogen release was located near the 
open stairway on the undersurface of the 305-ft level plane 
(Figure 12) . Henrie and Postma (3_) conclude that the primary path 
for entry of the hydrogen-and-steam mixture to the total reactor 
building above the basement (232 ft) level was through this 
stairwell. How these gases from the rupture disk line interacted 
with total ventilation patterns is not known. This may be a moot 
point since, by the time ignition occurred, hydrogen in the reactor 
building was substantially mixed. 
Identification of a specific ignition source is not possible 
from available documentation; however, two potential basement 
source-types are considered. (1) Several circuit boxes, instrument 
racks, meters, and control components were at various locations 
around D-rings and containment walls at undefined heights above the 
basement floor. Failure of circuit components may have been caused 
by immersion in water. (2) Plant operators who control core and 
reactor building conditions may have produced ignition arcs from 
control components perturbed by thermal or mechanical effects of 
reactor excursion.(2) The inner perimeter of the reactor building 
basement had no obstructions to block or blind flow of gases 
outside of the D-ring. However, there were constrictions that 
could temporarily horizontal hydrogen mixing in the basement. (_1) 
Approximately 10% of the cooled gases from the cooling system 
plenum (25,000 ft-vmin) was distributed to the basement (outside 
of the D-ring) through committed ducting. The only exit paths for 
these gases were the 4-in. seismic gaps, a space that physically 
separates each floor level from the reactor building, many pipe 
penetrations and the open stairwell that extended from the basement 
space "to the 347-level without barrier. (A recently identified 
path for hydrogen release is the in-core instrumentation cable 
chase which provides a large open area between the basement and the 
305-ft level.(12)) If ignition occurred at sources away from the 
open stairwell, the preferred flame propagation would be upward 
through the seismic gap, and above the 305-ft level, through the 
grating in the 347-ft level floor. Horizontal spread would occur, 
but at a slower rate, even during turbulent propagation 
conditions. Ample evidence exists on the 347-ft level to confirm 
flame propagation through the seismic gap regions and the floor 
grating. 
At the peak pressure rise of about 28 psig during the hydrogen 
burn, the adiabatic temperature rise during combustion of 6 to 8% 
hydrogen-in-air mixture is about 1000°K. At this temperature, 
calculated exposure radiative and convective flux (qt) from an 
optically thick combustion plume is 
2.2 W/cm2 < q t < 4.5 W/cm2 . 
This range is approximate because we assume values for combustion 
zone emittanca (e) at limits of the range 0.2 < E < 0.8. 
It is quite possible that e could be larger for optically thick 
hydrogen combustion zones.19) Figure 13 compares radiant emission 
from methane/air fires at various plume diameters. As zona volume 
increases, the product of emittance times absolute temperature 
correspondly increases. Since plume temperature is essentially 
constant, their flame and hot gas emittance is shown to be directly 
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proportional to gas volume. Heat transfer coefficient for minimum 
and maximum convective heat transfer is based on gas velocity 
(Ug) at the limits of the range: 
3 m/s < u < 12 m/s. 
Examination of TMI Materials 
To estimate the intensity of thermal exposure to damaged materials 
and to analyze thermal damage patterns, it is necessary to examine 
their condition and to determine their composition. Photographic 
evidence is inadequate for such appraisal. We examined materials 
removed from the reactor building, and recommended removal of 
additional materials for analysis. We examined the following 
materials (available July 193 3): 
Level 30 5 Level 347 Polar Crane 
Polypropylene Plywood board Fire extinguisher 
bucket 
Wood from tool box Hypalon polar crane 
pendant jacket 
control box 
Two radiation signs, 
probably polyethylene 





These materials retain residuaL radioactive contamination. 
Consequently, all examinations were performed under radiologically-
safe conditions. Chemical or physical analytical procedures could 
only be done with contaminated or easily decontaminated instruments. 
We were unable tc locate expendable diagnostic equipment; therefore, 
our examination of extracted materials was limited to detailed 
photography and macroscopic observations. 
Figure 14 shows photographs of plywood on the reactor building 
south wall and remains of an instruction or maintenance manual 
located on the reactor building north wall, both ignited by fire 
propagation through the seismic gap and/or radiant exposure from 
combustion gases in reactor building free volume. In Figure 14(a) 
note the wires along the wall also exhibit burn trauma. 
Figures 14(c) and 14(d) show the front and rear surface of the 
plywood panel after it was extracted from the south wall of the 
reactor building, over the seismic gap. Both sides are charred, as 
are edges and holes through which wire ties penetrate, surface 
char condition indicates the panel ignited to flaming combustion 
for a short period before self-extinguishing or being quenched by 
the reactor spray system. Regardless of the ignition source 
location, it is apparent that a hydrogen-and-air flame front 
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traversed most of the reactor building volume above (and probably 
below) the 305-ft level. Duration of this propagation was about 
12 s. Slow temperature decay before operation of the building 
spray system ensured thermal exposure to combustible or thermally 
sensitive surfaces was sufficient to produce thermal damage and/or 
ignition of these materials, particularly in regions where volume 
of the combustion plume was optically thick. 
The pendant and festoon for the polar crane possibly received 
the most intense energy exposure. The covering of this cable is 
Du Pont Hypalon and ethlylene propylene rubber. Figures 15(a) and 
15(b) show the lower polar crane pendant, and upper polar crane 
pendant and festoon along the "A" girder of the crane. 
Figures 15(c) and 15(d) show the relative thermal damage of cable 
sections extracted from the reactor building. (This examination 
was conducted at Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, in cooperation 
with Mr. Ralph Trujillo, Project Manager for the cable integrity 
project for TMI-2 reactor building electrical circuits. (_10)) A 
detailed description of thermal damage on each section is contained 
in Figure 16, along with a curve showing e/y activity along the 
pendant cable. Figures 15 and 16 show that all sections received 
thermal exposure, including those coiled on the D-ring catwalk. 
The degree of thermal degradation decreased from the polar-crane 
level to the D-ring top, and, in fact, was only apparent on the 
bottom pieces where cuts in insulation projected free surfaces of 
poor heat transfer. Thermal degration is also apparent on light 
lenses of the pendant control box. 
Maximum thermal damage occurs in the region from 6 to 10 ft 
below the polar crane girder (from about the 440-ft level down to 
about'T:he 406-ft level). This region shows locally high Q/y 
activity, which may correlate to physical absorption by porous, 
charred insulation. Thermal damage is severe and circumferentially 
equal in this region. Char depth on the polymer surface averages 
1 to 2 mm. 
From the 406-ft level to the top of the D-ring (the 367-ft 
level), thermal damage is progressively less and becomes more direc­
tional, i.e, half of the insulation circumference exhibited a 
heavier degree of damage, ranging from char at the 406-ft level to 
no perceptible insulation degradation just above the D-ring plane. 
The pattern of asymmetric thermal damage along the pendant below 
the 406-ft level (a distance approximately 14 ft below polar crane 
girder bottom) indicates exposure from a westerly direction.(10) 
The extent of thermal damage to other available polymers at about 
the 347-ft level indicates intense thermal exposure in southerly 
areas of the reactor building. Morever, since all containment 
gases above the 347-ft level were convected to the air-cooler intake 
plenums in the southern sector just below the 347-ft level, some 
preferential ventilation pattern may have influenced fire propaga­
tion path. However, because of fewer thermally susceptible 
materials in the north reactor building regions, we cannot 
confidently compare the south and north experience to define 
sources of non-uniform heat flux. Had there been either minimal 
thermal experience or other patterns in susceptible polymers in any 
other region, we may have had better opportunity to define fire 
geometry. One cause for asymmetry of the burn pattern below the 
406-ft level can be conjectured: the cable at this height was 
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exposed to radiation and convection resulting from hydrogen 
combustion originating from one side (logically the southwest side) 
of the reactor building. The exposed surface would sustain thermal 
damage more readily than the shadowed surface, thus producing the 
observed pattern. 
Photographic documentation of thermal damage patterns 
sustained by items removed from the TMI-2 reactor building revealed 
a variety of responses from different materials located in the same 
general area, e.g., materials around the telephone on the south 
reactor building wall of the 347-ft level show quite a different 
response relative to material composition. 
Thermal Measurements on Exemplar Materials 
To augment this analysis, we located exemplar materials generally 
similar to those removed from the reactor building. Response 
properties of the exemplar materials were measured in a thermal 
gravimetric aaalyzer (TGA) to ascertain the temperature range of 
thermal degradation and weight-loss rates. Figure 17 shows TGA 
patterns for ABS, acrylonitrile butadiene styrene, a standard 
material from the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) used as a 
control for smoke tests. ABS is similar to telephone body material. 
Thermograms are obtained by isothermally heating milligram-
sized samples of materials, supported on a micro balance, at a 
constant temperature rite. Weight loss with temperature indicates 
thermal degradation mode and mechanism. The temperature range of 
maximum weight loss indicates critical conditions for producing 
potentially ignitable pyrolyzates. Figure 17 shows that NBS-ABS 
flammable pyrolyzates are produced in the temperature range of 370° 
to 500°C, leaving about 20% inert materials as residue. These 
pyrolyzates are flammable which, with an external ignition source, 
will ignite within this range. 
The temperature corresponding to the median of weight loss 
during the first major weight-loss experience in any polymer can be 
used to estimate the condition where the rate of thermal 
destruction is maximum, as in the case of pyrolyzate production. 
Thus, we can use this temperature to define the time when subject 
materials are most susceptible to ignition. 
Using standard solutions for transient heat conduction in 
semi-infinite solids with constant thermal properties, it is 
possible to calculate the time at which a material's surface will 
attain a specific temperature upon exposure to constant thermal 
flux levels. Adjustments should be made to account for 
re-radiation heat losses from exposure surfaces and latent heat 
processes required to produce pyrolyzates from polymers. With 
specific surface temperature, exposure heat flux, and defined 
thermal constants, the time required to reach this temperature is 
determined by solution of the differential equation for transport 
heat flow in a semi-infinite solid: 
(1) 
-7- 0410A 
q t = total thermal exposure, 
T s = surface temperature, 
kpc = material thermal constants. 
Times calculated using this equation should be short relative 
to those for real materials which experience both thermal and mass 
convection heat losses. To account for these losses, we adjust 
qt by subtracting from it the surface radiation energy at the 
specified critical surface temperature and the mass convection 
losses (the product of surface mass loss and latent heat of 
pyrolysis). The resultant effective energy exposure rate qe 
replaces q t in Equation 1, giving a longer time to attain the 
critical temperature level. Values for time obtained by using both 
q-t and q e in Equation 1 bound the time range between exposure 
of an inert solid and a solid experiencing both re-radiation and 
latent heat losses. Critical temperature for the three materials 
is estimated to be 600°K, and thermal exposure energy is the high 
value calculated from both convective and radiative exposure during 
combustion of 8% hydrogen in air (qt = 4.5 w/cm ). 
These materials and times to critical weight-loss are 
w w 
Material 
Pine wood 5.3 s 9.4 s 
. PVC 32.0 s 54.7 s 
-ftcrylic 40.0 s 68.0 s. 
Times to attain critical temperature conditions in these 
materials are of the same order of duration as those recorded 
during the hydrogen burn in free volumes of the reactor building. 
Thus, all susceptible materials exposed to this energy should (and 
did) experience thermal degradation and/or flaming ignition. 
Hydrogen-Fire-Exposure Tests 
Thermal constants of most polymeric materials are defined only for 
virgin compounds. It is virtually impossible to calculate thermal 
response properties of commercially available polymers because 
additives, retardants, and fillers modify fundamental properties; 
however, simple hydrogen-fire-exposure tests may give an indication 
of accident exposure conditions. To assess this possibility, we 
conducted selected exposure tests on our exemplar materials using a 
Meeker burner adjusted to a fully pre-mixed burning mode.(11) Flow 
was adjusted to produce a measured flame temperature of 833°K 
(note: during measurement, the 20-mil thermocouple was incandes­
cent, so measured temperature was substantially lower than actva 1 
flame temperature). A simple-copper-slug calorimeter measurement 
of total thermal flux indicated an exposure flux of 6 W/cm . 
This level of flame temperature and thermal flux was within 
reasonable limits of projected TMI-2 accident measurements and 
estimated reactor exposure conditions. Thus, resulting data trends 
should be similar to thermal response variations of materials that 
suffered hydrogen-flame exposure in the TMI-2 reactor building. 
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Table I lists results of small-scale hydrogen-exposure tests. 
Note the time to significant thermal damage is well within times to 
critical exposure calculated herein. Similarity of thermal damage 
sustained by materials from the reactor building and those used in 
the small-scale test were encouraging. Both duration and intensity 
of test thermal exposure is in the range of estimated thermal 
fluxes extant during the reactor building burn. Note chat these 
are very simplistic tests. No attempt was made to refine 
temperature or thermal energy measurement. We have no illusion as 
to the distribution of convective or radiative contribution from 
the test burner; however, the results give data trends which are 
intuitively acceptable. 
Conclusions 
On the basis of 
o photographic and video surveys of the THI-2 reactor 
building interior, 
o visual and photographic analysis of materials extracted 
from the reactor building, 
o macro- and micro-experiments with materials of composi­
tion generically similar to that of extracted TMI 
samples, and 
o calculations using proposed physical conditons and 
assumed material properties, 
the following conclusions are posed: 
1. Hydrogen concentration in the reactor building prior to burn 
burn is confirmed to be about 8%, as calculated by 
analyzers of TMI-2 pressure and temperature records. 
2. No preferred path for hydrogen flame propagation has been 
established, and there is no evidence to preclude hydrogen 
deflagration throughout the entire free volume of the 
reactor building. 
3. The most probable ignition site for the hydrogen burn is in 
the basement volume outside of the D-ring: radial location 
is not defined. 
4. Thermal degradation of most susceptible materials on all 
levels is consistent with direct flame exposure from 
hydrogen fire. 
5. The directional character of damage to lower pendant length 
suggests potential geometric limitation of the hydrogen-
fire propagation paths. 
6. The total burn pattern of the plywood tack board for the 
south-wall telephone on the 347-ft level indicates flame 
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propagation through the seismic gap. 
7. Lack of thermal degradation to some thermally susceptible 
materials at the 305-ft and 347-ft levels may result from 
preferential moisture absorption, relative to thermally 
degraded materials at adjacent locations. Because of the 
random nature of this evidence, it is not likely that lack 
of damage resulted from selective shadowing. 
8. Burn patterns in the reactor building indicate that the 
dome region above the 406-ft level was uniformly exposed to 
direct hydrogen combustion and high heat flux for the 
longest duration. The region between the 406-ft level and 
the top of the D-ring was exposed to directional heat flux 
(most likely from the south and west quadrants); and, the 
damage on the 305-ft level was geometrically similar to 
that above t;ie 347-ft level but less severe. 
-10-
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Table I. Results of Hydrogen-Fire-Kxposure Tests 




Test (s) (J/cm2) Results of exposure 
Polypropy­
lene rope 1 12 72 Melted at ends, waxy 
1A 30 180 More melting at ends than test 1, 
some blending of materials 
IB 27 162 
1C 33 198 
Melting at point of contact, 
breakage occurred at 27 s into 
test with moderate pulling force 
applied 
More melting than test IB, break­
age occurred at 33 s into test 
with very little force applied 
Telephone 
receiver 
cord.— 2 12 72 Melting, fusing of jacket, 
conductors exposed, bubbling of 
clear plastic plug 
2A 30 180 More melting of jacket than test 
2, char formation, signs of drip­
ping, conductors exposed and 
ignited at 29 s into test 
Telephone 
dial 3 12 72 
3A 20 120 
Telephone 
dial (on 
screen) 4 30 180 
Melting at edges, some bubbling 
Melting at edges, incipient 
bubbling 
(Material placed on screen to 
prevent dripping onto burner) : 
Melted into screen, bubbling 
4A 20 unknown (Inadvertent flame temp decrease 
approx 30-40°C): Bubbling 
4B 35 unknown (Inadvertent flame temp decrease 
approx 30-40°C): More bubbling 
than 4A 
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Table I. Results of Hydrogen-Fire-Exposure Tests 
on Exemplar Materials (continued) 
Energy 
Time exposure 
Sample Test (s) (J/cm ) 
Telephone 
extension 
line 5 12 72 
5A 20 120 
Plywood 6 12 71 
6A 20 120 
6B 3 0 180 
6C 60 350 
Plywood 
(wet) 7 12 72 
7A 30 180 
7B 60 360 
ABS (white 
material) 8 12 72 
8A 20 120 
ABS (on 
screen) 8B 30 180 
8C 40 240 
Results of exposure 
Melting, charring along edge of 
cable, bubbling and deformation 
of clear plastic plug 
More charring and melting than in 
test 5; ignited approx 18 s into 
test 
Some charring along edges 
More charring than in test 6, 
minimal buring through top lamina 
More charring of top surfaces, 
outer edges, and corners; 
splitting of top layer 
Extreme charring of top surfaces 
and sides; ashy appearance at 
corners 
No noticeable change 
Slight char along one edge 
Charring approx like test 6B 
Loss of strength; bubbling, 
slight char, deformation 
More bubbling, deformation, 
blackening of approx 74% of 
surface area 
More bdbbling, melted edges, 
melted into screen, brownish 
color over surface 
ii 
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Table I. Results of Hydrogen-Fire-Exposure Tests 




Test (s) (J/cm2) Results of exposure 
Duct tape 9 12 72 
9A 20 120 
Widespread bubbling, penetration 
through top (silver) layer 
More bubbling than in test 9, 
penetration through top layer 








More bubbling, charring, melting 
of adhesive; penetration through 
top layer 
Plywood covered with single layer 
of polyethylene one side only: PE 
burned completely away, charring 
on 2 opposite edges 
Plywood covered with double layer 
of PE on one side only: 25% of 
PE lost due to drippage and 
shrinkage; charring along edges 
of plywood 
12B 20 120 
12C 12.5 75 
Double layer of PE on one side of 
plywood: PE burned completely 
away; charring at edges and cor­
ners of plywood; PE ignited at 
15 s into test and one edge of 
the plywood ignited also 
Wood placed in PE bag: Bag burned 
away at approx 7 s; noticeable 
color change in wood at approx 
12.5 s 
12D 9.5 57 
12E 13 78 
Plywood placed in PE bag: Bag 
burned away approx 6 s into test; 
noticeable color change in ply­
wood at approx 9.5 s 
Plywood placed in PE bag: Bag 
burned away approx 6 s into test; 
noticeable color change in ply­
wood at approx 13 s (this plywood 
was a darker piece than used in 
test 12D) 
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Table I. Results of Hydrogen-Fire-Exposure Tests 




Test (s) (J/cm2) Results of exposure 
T e l e p h o n e 
body 10 12 7 1 
i t 10A 20 12 0 
i i 10B 30 180 
Hose 11 12 72 
11 11A 20 120 
•t 11B 30 180 
t i 11C 60 360 
Loss of strength, some wrinkling 
Leathered appearance, bubbling 
More bubbling; otherwise same as 
test 10A 
No noticeable change 
No noticeable change 
Some discoloration 
Charring, slight deformation, 
melting of outer covering 
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Figure 1. Reactor coolant system schematic showing hydrogen release 
path through reactor coolant drank tank (1). 
Figure 2. Background activity as measured by sensor in dome [2). 
Figure 3. Hydrogen production estimates based on analysis of pre-
and post-burn core and reactor building indicators (3_). 
Figure 4. Reactor building pressure record (_1). 
Figure 5. Pressures recorded during the burn from OTSG (once-
through steam generator) pressure transmitters and pressure switch 
actuation times (1). Corresponding average temperature via 
procedure described in Ref.l added to psig scale. 
Figure 6. Pressure rise (Ap) produced by burning hydrogen 
ignited in constant volume chambers (^). 
Figure 7. Flame speed of varying hydrogen in air mixtures (£) . 
Figure 8. Lean methane and nitrogen in air mixture flame 
propagation patterns (6.9% CH 4 - 27.3% N 2 65.8% Air) (£) . 
Figure 9. Cross section of TMI-2 reactor containment building (J). 
Figure 10. Thermal and burn damage and potential overpressure on 
the 347-ft level (7-8). 
Figure 11. Temperature rise produced by combustion of pre-mixed 
hydrogen and air (3_). 
Figure 12. Schematic of reactor basement geometry showing relation 
of reactor coolant drain tank to relative gas distribution patterns 
u>. 
Figure 13. Emittance vs fire depth (9). 
Figure 14. Hydrogen-burned in-containment materials, (a) Bell 
telephone at TMI; (b) Charred manual on electrical box; (c) Plywood 
panel (back); (d) Plywood panel (front). 
Figure 15. In-containment views and sectional pieces of the polar 
crane pendant: (a) Job crane; D-ring A is in lower right; (b) 
Girder A of the polar crane; (c) North side of cable is ash; 
plastic tape is charred all around; no degradation under the tape; 
(d) Half of circumference is ash, half char (ash is gray; char, 
black). 
Figure 16. Thermal damage pattern and $/y activity along the 
Du Pont Hypalon and ethylene propylene covered polar crane pendant. 
Figure 17. Thermogram of NBS-ABS. In air, 20°C per min heating 
rate. 
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